My name is
David Robins:
Christian, lead developer (resume), writer, photographer, runner,
libertarian (voluntaryist),
and student.
This is also my son David Geoffrey Robins' site.
Finding fireworks
News ·Monday July 4, 2011 @ 11:51 EDT (link)
We had almost decided to skip the fireworks this year. After all, it wasn't like there was much to celebrate; the state is bigger and more controlling than ever. We didn't relish the idea of going to any of the theft-funded displays ("watching our tax money go up in smoke"), especially the Bellevue Park one that was always packed, or having to find and pay for parking anywhere. However, when they started going off around 2200 we walked down the hill to the gates of our apartment complex, to the street, to see what we could; then after about ten minutes we decided to walk back and drive to a nearby (small) park off 116th to see if anything was going on. We parked in a mess of cars and set on the trunk to see a few fireworks, but nothing amazing; and as it seemed to be winding down we left so as not to block anyone in the parking lot.
On the way back, though, we decided to cruise to see what we could, so continued north on Avondale toward Woodinville-Duvall road; we saw some explosions from a side street, so stopped briefly to see a small showing—we drove past during a break then turned around and parked to watch; but that didn't last long. A few streets over, though (opposite the Woodinville Library, near Cottage Lake) there was a really excellent show; two, really; two groups of neighbors (two families?). We got to it about 1030 and turned around in that street and parked on the side of the road.
They had some really excellent fireworks. Just did my heart good to know it wasn't my tax money they were lighting on fire. I would have paid for admission; it was a great show! It went on for an hour or more; we left as it was winding down. It was the equal of any fireworks show I've ever seen.
Books finished: Chainfire.
SCAR and ACOG
News, Guns ·Friday July 1, 2011 @ 19:30 EDT (link)
Scope finally arrived. TA11H-308G (3.5x, green horseshoe reticle, .308 BDC).
Went and shot after work . Really great. Scope is very clear, good eye relief—nicer than the EOTech, and doesn't require batteries and is both reticle and magnifier in one. Talked to a guy there (only other person), Buzzy, for a while afterward, too; from Mississippi, does rifle accurizing and taxidermy.
Books finished: Official Lies.
Shared libraries and symbol versions
News, Technical ·Saturday June 18, 2011 @ 15:20 EDT (link)
I was doing some more work on XBMC recently; I set it up to build in two parts: as a shared library, libxbmc.so, and a small binary, xbmc.bin (same as now, but built only from xbmc/xbmc.cpp). (This is similar to how Word is structured, with winword.exe and wwlib.dll, except Word loads wwlib.dll dynamically at runtime.) The plan is to be able to use XBMC functionality from other programs and utilities, without having to boot the GUI (so the various interfaces such as HTTP are unsatisfactory here).
Originally I was going to break XBMC into several shared libraries, but it's so intertwingled—GUI calls are everywhere, for example—that that swiftly became infeasible, although I hope further splits are possible later. I learned a few things while I was separating out this new library and other tasks; I learned how to use git better, and GitHub for the first time; when incorporating some other patches into a pull request, I taught myself a little about autoconf. When making Makefile changes, I had to change Makefile.in, or create one if one didn't exist (as for my new test harness). I also noticed that GCC generates two copies of constructors and three of destructors, which I thought was some problem with my build until I saw it was a rather old bug nobody cared to fix yet.
The first problem I ran into was that the link complained about missing symbols from the FreeType library. It turned out that mysql_config --libs emitted a -Wl,--as-needed as part of its library specification, but never terminated it with -Wl,--no-as-needed to restore the default behavior: so that was fixed in configure.in, using awk to check for the condition (since bash's string matching isn't guaranteed to be available but awk was already being used). This poor practice had always been there but only became a problem with the shared library refactor.
After that everything seemed to work well but there was a strange error: no sound; failed to enable audio device popup, etc.—just for video sound; the sound effects in the menus worked. I tracked this down (with a debug reinstall of ALSA) to an innocuous-looking call to snd_pcm_hw_params_set_rate_near from CALSADirectSound::Initialize. Oddly enough, it was coming back with -EINVAL, invalid argument. Apparently the ALSA 0.9 version of this function took an intenger value, and then was later upgraded to take a pointer to an integer (so the actual set value could be passed back). And, incomprehensibly, we were calling the old compatibility version, slicing all over the place and passing in a large number (32 bits of the address that was passed in) which was naturally rejected. I don't know why the loader defaulted to use that version of the function, since the default symbol, marked with @@, was the newer one.
You can believe I played around a lot with readelf, objdump, nm, etc.; and everything looked fine. I even enabled loader debugging (LD_DEBUG=all). One of my searches, however, found an online version of the ldd manpage that mentioned that --verbose would show library symbol versions—the ones following @ or @@ in symbol names, not the version of the library itself. And it showed that libxbmc.so had very few library dependencies (the loader, pthreads, C library) while xbmc.bin had the usual suspects (a stack of video, audio, decoder, display, and other libraries). This is how I though it was meant to work: and apparently it almost does but not quite. Documentation on the runtime linker is scarce, but presumably since libxbmc.so didn't specify its dependencies explicitly, it picked the oldest (lexicographically?) version for versioned symbols. Fix: move the $(LIBS) specification from the Makefile line for xbmc.bin to libxmbc.so. And now audio works.
Books finished: Naked Empire, The Checklist Manifesto: How To Get Things Right.
Curling morale event
News, Work ·Monday June 6, 2011 @ 16:23 EDT (link)
Left work via carpool around 1030; was at Granite Curling Club of Seattle; done around 1500. Won our game. Rather getting the hang of it toward the end. Got a ride with Derek R.
Books finished: The Pillars of Creation.
Compensating for fear: is forced Russian roulette just?
Political ·Tuesday May 24, 2011 @ 00:25 EDT (link)
Dr. Walter Block in a number of papers (e.g., Radical Libertarianism: Applying Libertarian Principles
to Dealing with the Unjust Government, or Taking the Assets of Criminals to Compensate Victims of Violence: A Legal and Philosophical Approach) advocates, with Rothbard (The Ethics of Liberty), that criminals owe their victims:
- reparations, to make them whole (e.g., medical bills, compensation for lost work, past and future);
- retribution, that is, having their crime visited back on them, including death for murderers: this is fully negotiable by the victim and his agent, who may instead demand monetary compensation, incarceration, or rehabilitation (at the criminal's expense, of course).
Dr. Block also argues that the criminal must be made to suffer the same level of fear as their victim as part of the retributive justice the victim is owed. The first problem arises here: "fear" and other emotions are subjective: we cannot tell to what degree the victim was scared, and nor how to equally scare the criminal. While some may be satisfied with a reasonable approximation, that does not make it objectively valid in the same way that reparations and retribution can be (visiting the same physical invasion upon the criminal). Nor, too, does the fact that the victim and criminal may negotiate alternates hurt that objectivity: because it is the agreement that makes for equivalence, not arbitrary selection. In fact, a victim could entirely forgive a criminal and demand no retribution (or reparations, for that matter); just as Andy cannot forgive Bob for punching Chris, (absent any agency contract to the contrary) Dennis has no claim against Bob if Chris refuses to pursue it.
But if we assume that people are similar enough that what scares one person scares another, or at least that there is a retributive right to attempt to scare the criminal in the same manner that they assaulted the victim—equivalent surprise, equivalent threat of death—then we can proceed to examine what methods are just. First, one could attempt to combine the retributive harm and scaring into one and have the victim or their agent surprise the criminal with the same crime. There are problems here, though: third parties will not know that this is an act of retributive justice and not initiatory violence, and may intervene; the criminal is expecting the attack and may recognize it as such and not be scared as we hoped; or the criminal and victim may have agreed on monetary compensation for the injury (but not the fear, with the criminal claiming that it dealt no damage), so the "fear" attack will never be more than a paper tiger since the criminal knows no harm will be done to them. The criminal may be stronger and win the encounter, or may regularly travel with a bodyguard (which he scarce could be asked to forgo leaving him defenseless against other threats), or not be in a position to be attacked, robbed, etc. in the same situation (this does not prevent us from visiting the same harm upon him in a different locale, such as a security firm's office).
We might even consider that the "second tooth" ("two teeth for a tooth", being reparations and retribution) contains within it compensation for the manner of the attack and the fear inflicted upon the victim. The reparation makes the victim whole and (as best possible) makes it "as if the invasion never happened"; the retribution is the further discouragement of repetition (otherwise crime always has a positive expected value) and the just return to the criminal of his bad act, to take away what he took. But crimes differ in mode and it is different to rob someone at gunpoint in a dark alley versus anonymously slipping them a note demanding money with a vague threat for noncompliance. To ignore entirely the mode is to remove any risk premium from the first sort of attack: but how significant is that? There is a right to defend against imminent threat (gun pointed in one's direction) but what is the right to retribution after the fact in this case? The criminal will laugh if the victim points a gun back in their direction, knowing that he has no plan to pull the trigger in any case; even if a random person does it on behalf of the victim, it is such an uncommon event that the criminal would assume it was the retributive justice owed him and not be frightened by it.
Dr. Block handles the "scare" factor by requiring the criminal to play Russian roulette with himself, with the number of bullets and cylinders depending on the severity of the crime. (Presumably equivalents are fine, since one paper mentions a gun with one bullet in one of a thousand cylinders; I do not believe any such firearm exists, but it can easily be simulated with a random number generator.) The principle is that the criminal must, in retribution for the fear engendered in his victim, put himself in a situation where there is some probability p, depending on the severity of the threat, where he may be killed. Naturally this may be negotiated with the victim, either changing p or removing the requirement entirely in exchange for a consideration. As one paper mentions, a very wealthy person might laugh off the "two teeth" requirement, but be willing to part with significantly more to avoid any chance of their own death. It will be acknowledged that there is no right to inflict the death penalty on someone in return for a scare, it is presumably argued that the roulette game is not doing this because the odds of death are less than 100%.
However, I argue that this chance-of-death requirement is not a valid part of libertarian justice. I will stipulate that the correct level of fear, p, can be found, or a close enough approximation; but considering the Russian roulette claim in light of statistical mathematics, it is unjust. Statistically, we consider the expected value of the harm done, i.e., the sum of all probabilities multiplied by their values. In this case, we have a probability p (calculated by dividing the number of bullets by the number of chambers) of death and a probability (1-p) of no harm, yielding an expected value of "p death", i.e., perhaps for a robbery p is one-tenth, or 0.1 (one bullet, ten chambers), then the expected harm from the Russian roulette game the criminal will be forced to play is "one-tenth death". No amount of mere emotional trauma (i.e., excluding a scare that causes a heart attack) can be objectively translated into physical harm; the problem is much like Hume's guillotine in philosophy. While the victim may not have known if they were to live or die, the fact remains that they did not die, and so no (even partial) loss of life may be justly visited on the criminal in recompense. The best that could be done would be to ensure the criminal is on the hook for whatever psychiatric help the victim needs; but that is part of reparations, not retribution. Nor is it a defense if it is known that the criminal will always negotiate his way out of playing: the unjustified harm is still available to the victim as leverage to claim a similarly unjustified payout.
One might object that removing the Russian roulette aspect of retribution allows the very wealthy to in effect "buy" their way out of any crime. First, this is a consequentialist and not a deontological argument; and while it is in part true, allowing equivalent payment does require the consent of the victim, and as this wealthy criminal's reputation spreads, it may take more and more money for the victims to forgo equal physical retribution, depleting our wealthy criminal's fortune at a rapid rate. Enough depredations may bring our rich criminal face to face with someone who stands by the lex talionis and refuses to accept any compensation at all: and that risk (for violent crimes) is on the same order as the Russian roulette game. An extremely wealthy shoplifter (or similar nonviolent criminal), can indeed continually pay his way out, but this both enriches the merchants involved and causes very little if any fear in the first place.
A last problem is in the case where the Russian roulette game was played and the criminal died, let us say, for a holdup in a dark alley netting him $100. That is, the penalty for this robbery was death, clearly not a commensurate one; and so just as (according to Rothbard) a police officer that tortures a petty thief is guilty of the harm caused, and owes reparation and is owed retribution, those that forced the criminal to play Russian roulette and so caused his death are guilty of murder, and justice requires they die for it (as usual, depending on the expressed wishes of the criminal or his heirs)—something that should make any court very leery indeed of insisting that such a game be played.
Neoconservatism: unprincipled or fascist?
Political ·Monday May 23, 2011 @ 21:15 EDT (link)
Conservatism (where it differs from Goldwater's vision, or libertarianism) is not a political philosophy. ItÂs not really equipped (with principles) to play there. This isnÂt even a shortcoming (a brick makes a poor automobile, but a fine building component). Keep it as a personal worldview and philosophy, a corner where it can shine. Hayek tells us:
The conservatives have already accepted a large part of the collectivist creed—a creed that has governed policy for so long that many of its institutions have come to be accepted as a matter of course and have become a source of pride to "conservative" parties who created them. Here the believer in freedom cannot but conflict with the conservative and take an essentially radical position, directed against popular prejudices, entrenched positions, and firmly established privileges. Follies and abuses are no better for having long been established principles of folly.
In general, it can probably be said that the conservative does not object to coercion or arbitrary power so long as it is used for what he regards as the right purposes.
So unproductive has conservatism been in producing a general conception of how a social order is maintained that its modern votaries, in trying to construct a theoretical foundation, invariably find themselves appealing almost exclusively to authors who regarded themselves as liberal.
When I say that the conservative lacks principles, I do not mean to suggest that he lacks moral conviction. The typical conservative is indeed usually a man of very strong moral convictions. What I mean is that he has no political principles which enable him to work with people whose moral values differ from his own for a political order in which both can obey their convictions. It is the recognition of such principles that permits the coexistence of different sets of values that makes it possible to build a peaceful society with a minimum of force. The acceptance of such principles means that we agree to tolerate much that we dislike. There are many values of the conservative which appeal to me more than those of the socialists; yet for a liberal the importance he personally attaches to specific goals is no sufficient justification for forcing others to serve them.
If people are harming themselves—and even others indirectly by that—there is no right to use force to stop them. You can encourage them verbally to seek help; you can even voluntarily provide or pay for such help (but not force it on them or force others to pay for it). Adults have a right to do things that may or even certainly will harm them. And if you oppose people harming others, guess what, you support the Non-Aggression Principle.
However, even opposition to people harming other people—which libertarians share—does not justify a state. It justifies self-defense and defense of others (the right to life necessarily includes a right to protect your own life and others that want the help). It justifies explicitly delegating that right to others, such as a private protection agency. But nowhere do you get the right to enforce a monopoly on such protection, or to coerce others to pay for it, or to Âprotect people from non-harm, or coerce them in any other way. Such a right simply doesnÂt exist, so cannot be delegated; to enforce one is mere collectivist thuggery.
In seeming opposition to that analysis, however, Bradley Thompson's inspired piece Neconservatism Unmasked argues instead that neoconservatism is a sound (as in consistent) political philosophy,
but don't whoop just yet, neocons: it's one very much like fascism, with these "principles" at the core:
- the collective "common good" is more important than the individual, and the "common good" is whatever those in power say it is (i.e., the usual collectivist thuggery we'd expect from socialists);
- it's fine for the "philosophers" (think Plato's ruling class) to deceive and control the "common man" with myth, jingoism, prejudice, and faith, and ultimately by force;
- as there are different truths for different people, there are different moral standards for different classes too; morality is redefined as sacrificing one's self for the "common good"—as dictated by the rulers, of course;
- politically, the elites know what is best for the "common people", while they do not, so it is appropriate for the elite to use government force to guide people to "true happiness".
Well; there you have it; principles, perhaps, but none any self-respecting or moral individual would want to admit to supporting. As the analysis goes further in the article, they are the "principles" of the fascist; the principles of, as I have often pointed out, individuals that want to rule by mere force and not right, and do not mind who they destroy to do it.
Thus a self-proclaimed conservative is thus stuck between two choices: a consistent political philosophy that would make Mussolini proud, or, rejecting this immoral unclothed neoconservativism, withdrawing back to a moral conservatism that is personal but can never be political, that is, be morally imposed by force on anyone else.
Dad recovering from bike accident
News ·Monday May 23, 2011 @ 10:39 EDT (link)
Mom called Saturday morning—while I was talking to Uncle John and Aunt Sharon and arranging to stop in as it happened—to let us know that Dad had taken a fall on his bike and broken some bones.
On Thursday May 19th he was biking on a rough road (construction zone), fell, and broke bones in his pelvis. They're letting it heal naturally (so far… this could still change); it may cause him to need a hip replacement five years or so down the road. He's in hospital and on pain meds. We called him Sunday afternoon to see how he's doing; he's holding up well; we talked about ten minutes. He'll be in hospital for a week, maybe two. They probably won't make it out here for graduation; it was nice that Aunt Sharon and Uncle John are coming (and offered to do parent duty for the day!) The injury is somewhat similar to John's fall on the ice this winter.
Our prayers and thoughts are with the family back in Ontario and we hope that recovery proceeds well.
The basis and extent of private property
Political, Law, Economics ·Monday May 23, 2011 @ 00:26 EDT (link)
As promised from the entry on Taxtion = robbery, a discussion on the nature of private property.
From Locke we get the idea of homesteading: mixing labor with property (real and otherwise). From him and others such as Rothbard, Nozick, and Rand (and many more, surely; those are just some luminaries that came to mind)—voluntary trade. Gifts are a subset of voluntary trade: a person elects to give someone something in return for nothing at all; this includes inheritance. These are the only legitimate ways in which property may change owners. Theft, robbery (which, as we saw, includes that robbery the state labls "taxation"), extortion, involuntary trade—all of these are illegitimate ways for property to change hands, and do not change ownership. If A steals from B and then B recaptures his possession, A is all the time the owner and the transfer back is not theft.
What counts as homesteading? If the state vanished overnight, could I fence the present Gila National Forest and claim it as my own? Of course, I couldn't use it all myself, but once I owned it, I could borrow against it to hire people to cut trees, or lease it out, right? Of course, that's a bit of a chicken-and-egg issue; something seems not right: I didn't have the means to harvest the Gila forest before I claimed it, and now I'm using my claim to profit from my claim. So one can reasonably request that homesteading requires pre-existing abilities; but then an existing logging company owner (or just a wealthy person) can claim a lot more forest than a regular individual. How, then, to prevent present moneyed interests from creating a new state?
If everyone was starting off from a state of nature, the question wouldn't arise because one would expect there to be enough property for everyone, or every family, to be able to have enough land to farm and to be able to homestead a share of the continental land mass. Later trade or some people's specialization might change the balance of ownership, but there would initially be little contention. Still: if two people want the same piece of land, how is it arranged? The normal market mechanism is price, but to whom is the price paid? Would one person pay the other to forgo their claim?
A digression into the new laws—even anarchy has laws, you may be surprised to find out; read Rothbard for some groundwork if you're missing it—on property may be in order. Private arbitration will tend toward majority opinion (because those that don't have no customers and no revenue); so to a point we are still hostage to a majority, albeit hopefully one that adheres to the basic non-aggression principle, to the idea of uniformity in law (no respect of persons), and so on. This is sufficient to uphold the above legitimate methods of property transfer, and oppose all others; and things like rules of evidence, penalties, and such will evolve, most likely borrowing from the most just courts of the present day. In particular, the non-aggression principle prevents a court from ruling that someone cannot own something and giving it away because the first person has "too much" property; the owner's own arbitrator will never rule that way, and one hopes that other parties will realize that a corrupt court such as that is in no-one's interests. Of course, worst case a majority of courts will be corrupted, but then we are no worse than under a state: keeping courts from such requires vigilance, and fortunately customers can respond quickly by taking their business away from unjust judges.
Returning to the contested "homestead" land that two people claimed at the same time, price must be a mechanism to determine ownership; so long as each is able to use the land they desire (has the means to build a house, farm it, and so on), one can pay the other for the claim, which only makes sense to do if the is that much more profitable to the person offering more.
Although it may seem unfair that going concerns can claim more land, it seems reasonable on "claim day" to allow for larger claims by those more able, so long as they can use all of the land they currently own plus the new land, at the same time (allowing for letting fields rest, and so on). Leasing land out, for purposes of homestead claims, cannot be allowed to count. This will ensure that the initial distribution of former "public" land goes to where it is most valued, but not punish efficient producers for being efficient.
But won't people claim land just to get paid off to no longer make the claim? Perhaps, but they get the payment in place of claiming other available land, so it makes more sense for individuals to make another arrangement with fellow claimants (if people are claiming a road intending to put in tolls, for example, to divide it up among those interested).
Once all land of interest is claimed as equitably as possible, then homesteading ceases to occur, except when land is abandoned. The definition of "abandoned" will surely be community-defined; but if no owner can be found for a given time, or a court is shown that legitimate attempts to find a known owner or representative have failed, then the land returns to nature and the first claimant that can use it takes ownership. In the main, though, at this point land changes hands by voluntary trade.
Anti-property anarchists may note that this still allows for rental of property; although in the homesteading stage property should be used by the owner, one can trade other goods for land and then rent it out. This is reasonable; to take away such land from the owner is to rob them of whatever goods they gave for it. So might not a concern obtain large amounts of land, and eventually form a state, and rule as such within their legitimately-owned domain? Perhaps. It is hoped that several things—distribution of homesteaded land among many people, for example—will reduce the likelihood of this problem, but it's possible that rent-seeking corporations, small and large, will arise. If they're just acting as landlords, nothing is wrong; if they contract with renters to allow them most of the freedoms of ownership (excepting, for example, sale or major improvements); but when they start demanding, say, a cut of voluntary transactions on their land (sales tax), then what? People will flee, certainly, to better landlords.
I suppose if these things happen to such an extent that no land is free from such restriction, then the great experiment will have failed; but I am not terribly worried about it, due to variety and competition and the difficulty of obtaining control over enough land to be a state. Even if a company creates a "company town" they will be deserted for better employers, or competition will arise at the fringes. Courts may refuse to allow for such "taxation"—can they do so without infringing on liberty themselves? My principle of contracts, which in a rough sketch requires they be specific (contract for a particular purpose, and anything outside that is a new contract) and severable may work; for example, a contract to pay a fixed amount for rent would be fine, but one that set rent to depend on sales made would not since it depends on an unrelated and generally unobservable event that doesn't harm (hence require compensation from) the landlord. However, a landlord could separately charge a fee by number of driving customers, say, if they affected shared parking offered. There are probably ways around this idea of contracts; I'm still developing it. And I certainly understand an objection to limiting contracts, although it would be private arbitration doing the limiting, not a central body—not an excuse, an explanation.
This is intended only to start a discussion. Any further ideas would be greatly appreciated, and books on the topic of property, homesteading, and such.
Books finished: The Law.
Utopianism, and why voluntaryism isn't utopian
Political ·Sunday May 22, 2011 @ 12:11 EDT (link)
Frequently voluntaryists are attacked with the baseless assertion that voluntaryism (anarcho-capitalism) is a "utopian" philosophy. By that what is generally meant is that it assumes and relies on all men being good, or at least (in context) respecting the non-aggression principle. Despite the reams of literature about crime and punishment in a free society, this fallacy is perpetuated. Even at the recent Block-Grubel debate, Dr. Grubel, a man one would expect to know better after 40 years of studying and teaching in the area, based almost his entire counter-argument on this misconception; he had clearly not read Rothbard; from For A New Liberty:
While it is vital for the libertarian to hold his ultimate and âextremeâ ideal aloft, this does not, contrary to Hayek, make him a âutopian.â The true utopian is one who advocates a system that is contrary to the natural law of human beings and of the real world. A utopian system is one that could not work even if everyone were persuaded to try to put it into practice. The utopian system could not work, i.e., could not sustain itself in operation. The utopian goal of the left: communism—the abolition of specialization and the adoption of uniformity—could not work even if everyone were willing to adopt it immediately. It could not work because it violates the very nature of man and the world, especially the uniqueness and individuality of every person, of his abilities and interests, and because it would mean a drastic decline in the production of wealth, so much so as to doom the great bulk of the human race to rapid starvation and extinction.
In short, the term âutopianâ in popular parlance confuses two kinds of obstacles in the path of a program radically different from the status quo. One is that it violates the nature of man and of the world and therefore could not work once it was put into effect. This is the utopianism of communism. The second is the difficulty in convincing enough people that the program should be adopted. The former is a bad theory because it violates the nature of man; the latter is simply a problem of human will, of convincing enough people of the rightness of the doctrine. âUtopianâ in its common pejorative sense applies only to the former. In the deepest sense, then, the libertarian doctrine is not utopian but eminently realistic, because it is the only theory that is really consistent with the nature of man and the world. The libertarian does not deny the variety and diversity of man, he glories in it and seeks to give that diversity full expression in a world of complete freedom. And in doing so, he also brings about an enormous increase in productivity and in the living standards of everyone, an eminently âpracticalâ result generally scorned by true utopians as evil âmaterialism.â
The libertarian is also eminently realistic because he alone understands fully the nature of the State and its thrust for power. In contrast, it is the seemingly far more realistic conservative believer in âlimited governmentâ who is the truly impractical utopian. This conservative keeps repeating the litany that the central government should be severely limited by a constitution. Yet, at the same time that he rails against the corruption of the original Constitution and the widening of federal power since 1789, the conservative fails to draw the proper lesson from that degeneration. The idea of a strictly limited constitutional State was a noble experiment that failed, even under the most favorable and propitious circumstances. If it failed then, why should a similar experiment fare any better now? No, it is the conservative laissez-fairist, the man who puts all the guns and all the decision-making power into the hands of the central government and then says, âLimit yourselfâ; it is he who is truly the impractical utopian.
On the contrary, it is those that think, despite history, the nature of man, and all logic, that a government will remain limited, that are utopians:
Thus, even in the United States, unique among governments in having a constitution, parts of which at least were meant to impose strict and solemn limits upon its actions, even here the Constitution has proved to be an instrument for ratifying the expansion of State power rather than the opposite. As Calhoun saw, any written limits that leave it to government to interpret its own powers are bound to be interpreted as sanctions for expanding and not binding those powers. In a profound sense, the idea of binding down power with the chains of a written constitution has proved to be a noble experiment that failed. The idea of a strictly limited government has proved to be utopian; some other, more radical means must be found to prevent the growth of the aggressive State. The libertarian system would meet this problem by scrapping the entire notion of creating a government—an institution with a coercive monopoly of force over a given territory—and then hoping to find ways to keep that government from expanding. The libertarian alternative is to abstain from such a monopoly government to begin with.
If we look at the socialist program advanced sixty, or even thirty years ago, it will be evident that measures considered dangerously socialistic a generation or two ago are now considered an indispensable part of the âmainstreamâ of the American heritage. … In fact, one of the reasons that the conservative opposition to collectivism has been so weak is that conservatism, by its very nature, offers not a consistent political philosophy but only a âpracticalâ defense of the existing status quo, enshrined as embodiments of the American âtradition.â Yet, as statism grows and accretes, it becomes, by definition, increasingly entrenched and therefore âtraditionalâ; conservatism can then find no intellectual weapons to accomplish its overthrow (Ibid.)
Slavery, protection, and monopoly find defenders, not only in those who profit by them, but in those who suffer by them. If you suggest a doubt as to the morality of these institutions, it is said directly—âYou are a dangerous experimenter, a utopian, a theorist, a despiser of the laws; you would shake the basis upon which society rests.â (Bastiat, The Law)
So let us hear no more of this folderol of a voluntaryist belief in âperfect peopleâ or utopianism, which we see is rather a bit of the pot calling the kettle black coming from any statist.
Interestingly, the original, i.e. Thomas More's Utopia was much more like socialism or communism and was almost entirely unfree. Of course, that does not mean the term could not be more widely applied if it fit; the problem is that it clearly does not.
Stefan Molyneux writes in Practical Anarchy:
First and foremost, although I am an anarchist, I am not a utopian. There is no social system which will utterly eliminate evil. In a stateless society, there will still be rape, theft, murder and abuse. To be fair, just and reasonable, we must compare a stateless society not to some standard of otherworldly perfection, but rather to the world as it already is. The moral argument for a stateless society includes the reality that it will eliminate a large amount of institutionalized violence and abuse, not that it will result in a perfectly peaceful world, which of course is impossible. Anarchy can be viewed as a cure for cancer and heart disease, not a prescription for endlessly perfect health. It would be unreasonable to oppose a cure for cancer because such a cure did not eliminate all other possible diseases—in the same way, we cannot reasonably oppose a stateless society because some people are bad, and a free society will not make them good.
He continues discussing societal makeup and the implications of various combinations of good and evil and how none of them justifies a state:
Two objections constantly tend to recur whenever the subject of dissolving the State arises. The first is that a free society is only possible if people are perfectly good or rational. In other words, citizens need a centralized State because there are evil people in the world.
The first and most obvious problem with this position is that if evil people exist in society, they will also exist within the State—and be far more dangerous thereby. Citizens are able to protect themselves against evil individuals, but stand no chance against an aggressive State armed to the teeth with police and military might. Thus, the argument that we need the State because evil people exist is false. If evil people exist, the State must be dismantled, since evil people will be drawn to use its power for their own ends—and, unlike private thugs, evil people in government have the police and military to inflict their whims on a helpless and largely disarmed population.
Logically, there are four possibilities as to the mixture of good and evil people in the world:
- That all men are moral;
- That all men are immoral;
- That the majority of men are moral, and a minority immoral;
- That the majority of men are immoral, and a minority moral.
(A perfect balance of good and evil is statistically impossible.)
In the first case, (all men are moral), the State is obviously unnecessary, since evil does not exist.
In the second case, (all men are immoral), the State cannot be permitted to exist for one simple reason. The State, it is generally argued, must exist because there are evil people in the world who desire to inflict harm, and who can only be restrained through fear of State retribution (police, prisons etc). A corollary of this argument is that the less retribution these people fear, the more evil they will do. However, the State itself is not subject to any force, but is a law unto itself. Even in Western democracies, how many policemen and politicians go to jail? Thus if evil people wish to do harm but are only restrained by force, then society can never permit a State to exist, because evil people will immediately take control of that State, in order to do evil and avoid retribution. In a society of pure evil, then, the only hope for stability would be a state of nature, where a general arming and fear of retribution would blunt the evil intents of disparate groups.
The third possibility is that most people are evil, and only a few are good. If this is the case, then the State also cannot be permitted to exist, since the majority of those in control of the State will be evil, and will rule over the good minority. Democracy in particular cannot be permitted to exist, since the minority of good people would be subjugated to the democratic will of the evil majority. Evil people, who wish to do harm without fear of retribution, would inevitably take control of the State, and use its power to do their evil free of that fear. Good people act morally because they love virtue and peace of mind, not because they fear retribution—and thus, unlike evil people, they have little to gain by controlling the State. And so it is certain that the State will be controlled by a majority of evil people who will rule over all, to the detriment of all moral people.
The fourth option is that most people are good, and only a few are evil. This possibility is subject to the same problems outlined above, notably that evil people will always want to gain control over the State, in order to shield themselves from retaliation. This option changes the appearance of democracy, of course: because the majority of people are good, evil power-seekers must lie to them in order to gain power, and then, after achieving public office, will immediately break faith and pursue their own corrupt agendas, enforcing their wills with the police and military. (This is the current situation in democracies, of course.) Thus the State remains the greatest prize to the most evil men, who will quickly gain control over its awesome power—to the detriment of all good souls—and so the State cannot be permitted to exist in this scenario either.
It is clear, then, that there is no situation under which a State can logically or morally be allowed to exist. The only possible justification for the existence of a State would be if the majority of men are evil, but all the power of the State is always controlled by a minority of good men. This situation, while interesting theoretically, breaks down logically because:
- The evil majority would quickly outvote the minority or overpower them through a coup;
- Because there is no way to ensure that only good people would always run the State; and,
- There is absolutely no example of this having ever occurred in any of the dark annals of the brutal history of the State.
The logical error always made in the defense of the State is to imagine that any collective moral judgments being applied to any group of people is not also being applied to the group which rules over them. If 50% of citizens are evil, then at least 50% of the people ruling over them are also evil (and probably more, since evil people are always drawn to power). Thus the existence of evil can never justify the existence of the State. If there is no evil, the State is unnecessary. If evil exists, the State is far too dangerous to be allowed existence.
Why is this error always made? There are a number of reasons, which can only be touched on here. The first is that the State introduces itself to children in the form of public school teachers who are considered moral authorities. Thus is the association of morality and authority with the State first made, and is reinforced through years of repetition. The second is that the State never teaches children about the root of its power—force—but instead pretends that it is just another social institution, like a business or a church or a charity. The third is that the prevalence of religion has always blinded men to the evils of the State—which is why the State has always been so interested in furthering the interests of churches. In the religious world-view, absolute power is synonymous with perfect goodness, in the form of a deity. In the real political world of men, however, increasing power always means increasing evil. With religion, also, all that happens must be for the good—thus, fighting encroaching political power is fighting the will of the deity. There are many more reasons, of course, but these are among the deepest.
I mentioned at the beginning of this section that people generally make two errors when confronted with the idea of dissolving the State. The first is believing that the State is necessary because evil people exist. The second is the belief that, in the absence of a State, any social institutions which arise will inevitably take the place of the State. Thus, Dispute Resolution Organizations (DROs), insurance companies and private security forces are all considered potential cancers which will swell and overwhelm the body politic.
This view arises from the same error outlined above. If all social institutions are constantly trying to grow in power and enforce their wills on others, then by that very argument a centralized State cannot be allowed to exist. If it is an iron law that groups always try to gain power over other groups and individuals, then that power-lust will not end if one of them wins, but will spread across society until slavery is the norm.
It is also very hard to understand the logic and intelligence of the argument that, in order to protect us from a group that might overpower us, we should support a group that has already overpowered us. It is similar to the statist argument about private monopolies—that citizens should create a State monopoly because they are afraid of a private monopoly.
I put this note together because the fallacy comes up with shocking frequency by the naïve or ignorant, so wanted a location to send them with a comprehensive destruction of such fallacious attacks. Feel free to use it in your own discussions too, as needed.
Block-Grubel size of government debate
News, Political ·Saturday May 21, 2011 @ 21:38 EDT (link)
We went up to BC to visit relatives in Abbotsford, and to attend a size of government debate between Dr. Walter Block (anarcho-capitalist) and Dr. Herbert Grubel (neoconservative? minarchist?) I was having some trouble confirming details about the debate, such as whether we could get in without an RSVP to an email address we didn't know about (we and another couple, at least, had seen the earlier note about the debate, possibly linked from Dr. Block's Facebook page), but the more recent post was more welcoming ("So, if you're in the neighborhood, c'mon down.") That's part of the reason we waited until the last minute to call Uncle John and Aunt Sharon about stopping in; and it was surprising that they weren't busy given how involved with church, local government, and associations they are. They kindly invited us up for dinner before the debate (others were eating at the restaurant, Cheers, starting at 1800, debate at 1900, but I had no idea what the restaurant was like, or if it was restaurant at all, and not a hall with the Cheers "catering service" providing limited refreshment). We had a nice visit with them and Grandma, arriving at 1430 and leaving to head over to North Vancouver at about 1730.
We made good time despite construction on the Trans-Canada, and got to the location (parking in the garage underneath/out back) at about 1830. It was indeed a fairly typical restaurant; it's in a busy downtown area, so space is at a premium and they try to make the most of it; it appeared above "greasy spoon" and below "fine dining"; since we'd eaten we only ordered a Coke. It was $2 apiece for the debate (possibly for the cost of the room; much more reasonable than the $60 the Libertarian Party of Canada wanted for entry into their convention): the group had a medium-sized room with tables arranged in a horseshoe with the debaters and moderator Paul at the center. Dr. Block brought his son Matthew and Dr. Grubel brought his wife Helen.
Dr. Block talked about principles, focusing on the non-aggression principle and the immorality of harming innocent people.
Dr. Grubel came to a different debate entirely, and talked about his work in government and a graph not in evidence that showed somehow that economic freedom was maximized when government took 22% of all income (and baked it into pies, for all we know). He never answered Dr. Block on the principles of even the existence of government. There was a complete disconnect; some of the fallacies he committed included: ad hominem (calling Dr. Block "utopian", "idealistic", and so forth), appeal to tradition, appeal to ridicule, begging the question (assuming the ends, i.e., government, without defending them, and then claiming "we know" for facts not in evidence), post hoc (his alleged chart did not isolate for causes). Some other errors were failing to read Rothbard (and thus learning that libertarians are not utopian), and assertion that anarchists is against organization and would have to do everything for themselves from scratch (anarchist only oppose coercion, not voluntary organization: associations, businesses, etc.).
I asked Dr. Grubel if he was aware of Hume's guillotine, and if he was a utilitarian; he said he was. I asked if he would support the killing all black males of a certain age (in retrospect I felt bad about any racist implications in the question, and in future will borrow Rothbard's example of redheads when he destroyed utilitarianism) if it was shown that doing so maximized utility; he said that he would not, because it would be immoral—i.e., other principles must come into play. Not a pure utilitarian (maybe nobody is?); what are his fundamental political philosophical principles, i.e., where would he advocate the use of force? The libertarian answer is clear.
I would liked to have seen the debate as a whole be about fundamental principles, although it was good that Dr. Block could discuss libertarian organization of private police, courts, and defense, homesteading, and the like.
I got to talk to Dr. Block briefly at the end, and his son Matthew, and he sent an email out to those of us in Seattle to let us know about each other.
We left the place at around 2115, and got home just after midnight.
Books finished: Faith of the Fallen.
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